Book Manuscript

It is a familiar observation that the possibility of war permeates relations among states under anarchy. It is less well appreciated that states deliberately and routinely regulate that possibility by treaty. Three ambitious examples of such regulation – the inclusive non-aggression pacts embedded in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920), Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), and Charter of the United Nations (1945) – have attracted enormous attention from political scientists and historians alike. Few scholars appreciate that these three instruments are, however, only the most well-known cases inhabiting a much broader universe. Indeed, across the past two centuries alone, various groups of three or more states concluded over 97 legal instruments containing 121 distinct provisions variously circumscribing the right and ability of different states to engage in militarized bargaining. These provisions vary substantially in their geographical coverage (local, regional, or global), scope of membership (exclusive or inclusive), and rule of prohibition (neutralization of states, demilitarization of territory, or prohibition of aggressive war). Despite their ubiquity in modern interstate relations, states’ use of multilateral prohibitions on militarized bargaining is documented only incompletely and rather imperfectly understood. Why do states enact them? What explains variation in their design? And what does the historical record of multilateral prohibitions on militarized bargaining tell us about the ability of states, especially the great powers, to regulate the intensity and scope of strategic competition under anarchy? In The Fragile Peace: Rules of Neutralization, Demilitarization, and Non-Aggression and the Institutional Logic of Multilateral Prohibitions on Militarized Bargaining, I develop an institutionalist theory that resolves these questions, provides guidance on the use of neutralization, demilitarization, and non-aggression pacts as policy instruments, and fundamentally revises our understanding of the origins and historical significance of some of the most familiar multilateral prohibitions on militarized bargaining, including the inclusive non-aggression pacts embedded in the Covenant of the League of Nations and Charter of the United Nations.

Publications

• “Jus contra Bellum in the Modern States System: Reflections on the Anomalous Origins of the Crime of Aggressive War", St Antony's International Review, vol. 10, no. 2 (2015), pp. 141-67; access a copy of this paper here.

• “At the Crossroads of Law and Licence: Reflections on the Anomalous Origins of the Crime of Aggressive War”, in Historical Origins of International Criminal Law, vol. 1, edited by Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, and Yi Ping (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), pp. 409-35; access a copy of this chapter here.